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object thereof, is entitled to look at and examine the merchandise, and, in so
doing, devote his attention primarily thereto. He is not required, therefore,
to exercise those precautions to observe and avoid danger which he would
exercise in the absence of the said relation.23
There are many cases which involve the same or similar factual situation
as the principal case.24 The same general principles discussed above govern
them and most, if not all of them may be rationalized thereon. In Dowling
v. McLean Drug Co., where the plaintiff entered a drug store to make a tele-
phone call and tripped over a weighing machine, the court held that he was
an invitee and not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Since more than one conclusion might reasonably be drawn from the at-
tendant circumstances, contributory negligence was held to be a question for
the jury.2 5 In a similar case, Reed v. Hammel Dry Goods Co., where the
weighing machine had been in the same position for tvo years, it was held
that the defendant was not negligent as a matter of law since a reasonably
prudent and careful management might not anticipate that injury would
result from the obstruction.26 In Brinkworth v. Sam Seelig Co., where the
proprietor of a vegetable market having a center stand around which were
counters for the delivery and display of goods, and the space between con-
stituted an aisle for the use of customers, the defendant was held liable for
injuries to a customer who, in leaving, stepped backward and fell over boxes
placed in the aisle three hours before, contrary to the custom of the defend-
ant.27 But, while it is negligence for a proprietor to leave a box in an aisle
through which customers have to pass, no recovery was allowed in Williams
v. Liberty Stores for injuries to a customer from falling over a box which
was in plain view for twenty-seven feet when he was hurrying down the
wrong side of the aisle, after traversing the full length of the aisle previously
without seeing the box, since in the exercise of reasonable care he must have
seen it.28 A customer was held contributorily negligent in Mullen v. Sensen-
brenner Mercantile Co., where she noticed a defect in the store entrance upon
entering and fell over it upon leaving, because she had knowledge of the dan-
ger and therefore the duty to avoid it.29 However, in Downing v. Merchants
National Bank it was held that a person about to enter a business building
where the public is invited to enter, is not guilty of negligence as a matter of
law in failing to look at the floor of the vestibule or corridor before crossing
the threshold of an open door.30
In the principal case, there was no evidence of unreasonable conduct on
the part of the plaintiff. The interrogatory merely brought forth facts from
which an inference of contributory negligence might or might not be drawn.
No inference was drawn by the jury and since there was no unequivocal
conclusion to be reached the court could not decide that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
H. P. C.
Workmen's Compensation-Refusal by an Employee to Accept Proffered
Medical Services. Witte, employee of J. Winkler and Sons, prosecutes this
appeal from a decision of the Industrial Board which adhered to demands of
23 Bloomer v. Snelling (1908), 221 Pa. 25, 69 A. 1124.
24 33 A. L. R. 181; 33 A. L. R. 218.
25 (1928), 248 Ill. App. 270.
26 (1927), 215 Ala. 494, 111 So. 237.
27 (1921), 51 Cal. App. 668, 197 P. 427.
28 (1921), 148 La. 450, 87 So. 233.
29 (1924), 260 S. W. 982 (Mo.).
30 (1921), 192 Iowa 1250, 184 N. W. 722, 20 A. L. R. 1138.
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Winkler and Sons based on alleged change in conditions. Although afflicted
with a double inguinal hernia, appellant refused to submit to an operation
tendered at the financial responsibility of employer. Refusal was prompted
by an untoward physical condition and his advanced age of 64 years. An
expert witness, A, appeared at the request of the insurance carrier of appellee
and was identified at the hearing as a nephew of one of the insurance agents
and thus was not entirely divorced from interest in this claim. The exami-
nation brought an assertion that Witte should undergo the operation. Wit-
ness B, qualified by appellant, found Witte a "poor risk" for an herniotomy.
A family doctor of Witte testified in accord with witness B. From this
evidence the Industrial Board found that the refusal to submit to an opera-
tion was unjustified. Held, The refusal, under the statute, must be unrea-
sonable to bar further compensation during the interim in which refusal
persists. Burden of proof of a change in condition was upon appellee, an
obligation they failed to sustain.1
Section 25 of the 1926 statute provided, "The refusal of the employee to
accept such (medical) services and supplies, when so provided by the em-
ployer, shall bar the employee from all compensation during the period of
such refusal, unless, in the opinion of the industrial board, the circumstances
justify such refusal."2  With the revision of this proviso in 1929, the legis-
lature, after reciting that a refusal will be a bar to further compensation,
tacitly expelled the limitation clause formerly cited when justifying a rejec-
tion. 3 There is no expression in the opinion of the court that reveals a
judicial consciousness of this statutory change. The laconic gesture, "We
hold that such refusal of the employee must be unreasonable and without
just cause," forces the interpretation of the 1929 provision into conformity
with the Indiana decisions prior to the revision.4 Furthermore, this con-
struction adheres to the continuity of similar tests in other jurisdictions.5
To have held that the removal of this sufi-x alone manifests a legislative
intention to unconditionally suspend the right to compensation upon rejec-
tion of medical treatment would render the operative effect of the statute
a grotesque mockery of its declared purpose. A literal reading of the revi-
sion, judicially applied, would leave labor the victim of whatever balance
the employer might strike between cupidity and conscience. Unreasonable
and vicious demands that an injured employee submit himself to whatever
perversions of medical culture genius can devise would be levied with im-
punity by employers. At once, by the statute, the employee would find
himself deprived of his common-law remedies and further discover his em-
ployer fortified with an impregnable immunity as the consequence of a just
refusal to accept an offer that might well imperil his life. Neither a volatile
imagination nor an bpinionated sympathy need be invoked to concur in the
construction which the court has given this section of the compensation law.
Reason will not permit the literal phrasing of a sentence to be abstracted
from its context that the whole statute be turned to literary nothingness.
I Witte v. J. Winkler & Sons, Inc. (1934), 190 N. E. 72 (Ind. App.).
2 Burns' Ann. Statutes (1926), see. 9470-25.
3 Burns' Ann. Statutes (1929 Supp.), sec. 9470-25.
4 Enterprise Fence & Foundry Co. v. Majors (1918), 68 Ind. App. 575, 121 N. E. 6;
Bradbury v. Hymera Coal & Mining Co. (1931), 92 Ind. App. 626, 176 N. E. 875.
5 Mt. Olive Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission (1920), 295 Ill. 429, 129 N. E. 103;
0. V. Rosenthal & Co. v. Industrial Commission (1920), 295 Ill. 182, 129 N. E. 176;
Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co. (1913), 178 Mich. 265, 144 N. W. 563; Frost v.
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (1922), 109 Neb. 161, 190 N. W. 208; United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wickline (1919), 103 Neb. 681, 173 N. W. 689;
Myers v. Wadsworth Mfg. Co. (1921), 214 Mich. 636, 183 N. W. 913; O'Brien v. Albert
A. Albrecht Co. (1919), 206 Mich. 101, 172 N. W. 601; McNelly v. Hudson & M. R.
Co. (1915), 87 N. J. Law 455, 95 Atl. Rep. 122.
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The essence is ascertainable only by a viewing of all the aspects in their
proper proportion. Statutory construction is amenable to this process of
human observation. Moreover, the omnipresent sanction to a liberal con-
.struction of the statute in behalf of the employee would seem to commend
the position taken by the court.6
The opinion imposes a duty upon the employee to accept those tendered
medical services as are reasonable. This duty is of initial import since
Section 8 of the statute delegates the burden of proof unto the defendant
where compensation is barred because of a wilful failure or refusal to per-
form any statutory duty.7 Unless the court considered the employer as the
defendant in this action on the assumption that the hearing because of a
change in conditions was a continuation of the proceedings for the original
compensation award, the burden of proof fell wrongly upon the appellee.
In thus allocating this obligation, the blanket statement that, "One prosecut-
ing an appeal because of change of condition since the last preceding award,
sustains the burden of proof," was alone relied upon as authority. Taken
from the Indiana case, Berkey v. Chase Bag. Co.,8 where the appeal did not
arise from an alleged breach of statutory duty, the approved statement,
nevertheless, appears sufficiently broad to commit the court to its application
in every case, regardless of Section 8.
If the employee is in fact under such a duty, there is a correlative right
in the employer. "A right is the legal capacity, or ability, to enforce action
or forbearance by another, because it is his duty."9  This ability to enforce
a stipulated mode of conduct upon another necessarily implies a method of
coercion through the legal process. It may be contended that the suspension
of compensation is such a remedial right as to mark an antecedent right in
the employer. However, it appears more accurate to describe an unreason-
able refusal on the part of an injured employee as suspending or annihilating
a duty owed by the employer to furnish compensation. Thus, an unreason-
able rejection is not a breach of duty but rather a condition subsequent
obliterating the duty to a continuation of compensation.' 0 If this be a proper
rationale, Section 8 of the statute is inapplicable and the cases would thereby
harmonize with the usual rule of holding the burden of proof upon the party
who carries the affirmative of the issue, in this instance, the employer.
Having quoted a postulate that the award of the Industrial Board is
impregnable to attack where any competent evidence has been introduced by
the successful contender upon the disputed fact," the court finds that "no
evidence sustains the finding of the board." There is the accompanying
limitation that the evidence will not be weighed "unless the evidence is of
such a conclusive character as to force a contrary conclusion."'1 2 However,
6 United Paper Co. v. Lewis (1917), 65 Ind. App. 356, 117 N. E. 276; Stacey
Brothers Gas Construction Co. v. Massey (1931), 92 Ind. App. 348, 175 N. E. 368; In re
Ayers (1919), 66 Ind. App. 458, 118 N. E. 386.
7 Burns' Ann. Statutes (1929 Supp.), sec. 9453-8.
8 Berkey v. Chase Bag Co. (1933), 187 N. E. 679 (Ind. App.).
9 Willis, Anglo-American Law (1931), p. 22.
10 Jendrus v. Detroit Steel Products Co. (1913), 178 Mich. 265, 144 N. W. 563.
"The statutory obligation to give maintenance during the period of incapacity resulting
from an accident is subject to the implied condition that the workman shall avail him-
self of such reasonable remedial measures as are within his power."
"1 Berkey v. Chase Bag Co. (1933), 187 N_ E. 679 (Ind. App.); Vonnegut Hard-
ware Co. v. Rose (1918), 68 Ind. App. 385, 120 N. E. 608; Star Publishing Co. v. John-
son (1925), 83 Ind. App. 348, 175 N. E. 368; J. H. Hardin Co. v. Crowe (1924), 81 Ind.
App. 513, 143 N. E. 710.
12 Swing v. Kokomo Steel and Wire Co. (1919), 75 Ind. App. 124, 125 N. E. 471;
Roush v. W. R. Duncan & Son (1932), 96 Ind. App. 122, 183 N. E. 410; Goshen Veneer
Co. v. Cozzi (1931), 93 Ind. App. 160, 176 N. E. 634; Indianapolis Heat & Light Co.
v. Fitzwater (1918), 70 Ind. App. 422, 121 N. E. 126.
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the testimony of witness A, hereinbefore stated, offered some ground upon
which to sustain the holding of the board, had the rule first set forth been
strictly applied. Regardless of the overstatement that no evidence was ad-
duced to support the holding of the Industrial Board, it would appear that
a proper conclusion was reached upon the balance of the evidence.
Despite the ostensible benevolence of Section 25, a decision contrary to
that offered by the court would leave labor standing upon a bankrupt statute.
J.F.T.
